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Abstract
This paper examines the implications of the expectations theory of the term structure for the
implementation of inflation targeting. We show that the term structure weakens the transmission of
short term interest rates to ultimate policy objectives. Therefore, short term interest rates in the
central bank's forward looking monetary policy rule need to respond more strongly to the output gap
and deviations of inflation from its target. Thus, in general the term structure implies a higher degree
of policy activism. Next, we show that both the sensitivity of the term spread to economic
fundamentals, and the extent to which the spread predicts future output, are increasing in the duration
of the long bond and the degree of structural output persistence. If the central bank becomes
relatively less concerned about inflation stabilisation the term spread becomes less sensitive to
fundamentals, and the spread will be less successful in predicting real economic activity.
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1. Introduction
Since the early 1990’s the conduct of monetary policy in many countries has switched to a regime of
direct inflation targeting. This change was triggered either as a result of the breakdown of the
relationship between growth rates in monetary aggregates and inflation (New Zealand and Canada) or
because of the disappointment following the use of exchange rates as an intermediate target for
monetary policy (United Kingdom, Sweden and Finland). The use of inflation targets derives its
theoretical rationale from the fact that they can be used to overcome credibility problems since they
can mimick the results of optimal performance incentive contracts (see Walsh (1995) and Svensson
(1997a)).2 However, these theories assume that central banks can instantaneously choose the rate of
inflation. Contrary to this assumption, in practice central banks rarely directly set some desired level
for the money supply but rather conduct monetary policy by deciding upon the price at which the
banking system’s systematic shortage of central bank balances on the interbank money market will be
relieved. This gives the central bank perfect control over the day-to-day interbank interest rate.
Moreover, this interest rate will affect the rate of inflation with a considerable time lag. From a
theoretical perspective this raises the issue as to how explicit inflation targets should be translated into
monetary policy instruments. A first contribution to this question was made by Svensson (1997b) who
has shown that, because of lags in the transmission process, inflation targeting implies inflation
forecast targeting. In this analysis the inflation forecast produced by the central bank’s structural
model of the economy3 becomes an ideal intermediate target since it is by definition closely related to
the ultimate policy goal and since it can be perfectly controlled by the central bank. Furthermore, the
inflation forecast will lead to an endogenous optimal interest rate reaction function which has the
same form as the Taylor rule (Taylor (1993)).
Also, the past few years have seen a revival of  interest in the importance of the term-structure of
interest rates for the transmission of monetary policy (e.g. Turnovsky (1989), Goodfriend (1997)).
Changes in the central bank’s key interest rate are transmitted to longer term interest rates through
the term structure. In particular, the expectations hypothesis of the term structure assumes that these
longer term interest rates will be equal to a weighted average of expected future one-period interest
rates (i.e. the expected future values of the central bank’s instrument). These longer term interest
rates will, in turn, affect the determinants of aggregate demand.
Recently, research in this respect has focussed on explanations for the failure of predictive content of
                                               
2 For an analysis that looks at the implications of preference uncertainty for the equivalence of linear Walsh (1995)
contracts and (quadratic) Svensson (1997a) inflation targets, see Schaling, Hoeberichts and Eijffinger (1998).
3 Bernanke and Woodford (1997) have argued that inflation forecast targeting can only work if the inflation forecast is
based on the central bank’s own structural model of the economy. They show that responding to private sector forecasts
may lead to indeterminacy or non-existence of a rational expectations equilibrium.
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long-short spread for future movements in interest rates (McCallum (1994) and Rudebusch (1995)),
and on the interaction between the term structure and shifts in the conduct of monetary policy in
VAR-models (Fuhrer and Moore (1995), Fuhrer (1996)).
The purpose of this paper is to incorporate the term structure of interest rates into the Svensson
(1997b) inflation forecast targeting framework. To this end, Section 2 will present a model in which
monetary policy affects the real economy via the term structure. Section 3 will derive the endogenous
optimal interest rate reaction function and will discuss the determinants of policy activism. Next, in
Section 4 we will discuss the determinants of the sensitivity of the real term spread with respect to the
underlying state of the economy and the factors which affect the covariance between the term spread
and output in the subsequent period. Finally, Section 5 will analyse the implication of the interaction
between the optimal monetary policy rule and the term structure of interest rates for the predictive
value of the term spread as far as future movements in long-term interest rates are concerned
2. Monetary Policy and the Term Structure
The purpose of this section is to incorporate the term-structure of interest rates in the Svensson
(1997b) inflation forecast targeting framework. To this end we assume that the short real rate (rt) and
the long real rate (Rt) are related by the following version of the Pure Expectations Hypothesis (PEH)
r R D E R Rt t t t t= − −+( )1  (2.1)
Here rt represents the real yield to maturity on a  one-period bond which is traded on the interbank
money market. The LHS denotes the (one-period) real holding period return on a long-term bond.
The latter’s real yield to maturity (Rt) is the long-term real interest rate. The parameter D is defined
such that D + 1 is equal to Maccaulay’s duration. 4
                                               
4 If the long-term bond is a pure discount bond, D+1 will be equal to the maturity of the bond (N). In that case










































Since Rt+1 is a stochastic variable, Jensen’s Inequality will affect this equation because lnEt(X) ≠ Et(lnX) and because
Et(1/X) ≠ 1/Et(X). However, since equation (2.1) yields a very convenient linear approximation, it is quite standard in
the term structure literature to ignore this effect (see e.g. Fuhrer and Moore (1995)) Ignoring the effect of Jensen’s
Inequality, omitting N and N-1 from the yield to maturity subscripts and taking logs on both sides of the equation then
yields equation (2.1).
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For our purposes it turns out to be convenient to rewrite (2.1) to express the current long real rate as
a convex combination of the current short real rate and the expected long real rate in the next period:5
R k r k E R k
D
Dt t t t





Note that the long and short real interest rates will be equal if the parameter k is equal to zero. In that
case the duration of the long-term bond6 will be equal to one and the model will collapse into the
original Svensson (1997b) model in which there is no distinction between short and long term interest
rates.
The current short-term real interest rate will be equal to:
r i Et t t t= − +π 1 (2.3)
Here it is the instrument of the central bank (i.e. the nominal interest rate on the interbank money
market) and Etπt+1 represents the expected rate of inflation in period t+1 conditional on the
information set in period t.
Following Svensson (1997b) we assume that inflation and output are linked by the following short-
term accelerationist Phillips-curve relationship:7
π π αt t ty+ = +1 1 (2.4)
                                                                                                                                                









τ , i.e. the current long-term real rate is a weighted average of
expected future short-term real rates (see Schiller et al (1983)).
6 If the long term bond pays coupon interest, then Macauly’s duration will be strictly smaller than maturity and will
actually depend on Rt .However, for reasons of tractability we will treat D as a constant. In this case equation (2.1) can
be shown to be a log-linear approximation of the condition for equalisation of expected holding period returns (see
Shiller, Campbell and Schoeholtz (1983)).
7 As noted amongst others by Ball (1997), this equation ignores the Lucas critique and therefore violates the natural
rate hypothesis since an ever increasing rate of inflation can coexist with a systematic positive value of the output gap.
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where πt  ≡ pt - pt-1 , the inflation rate in period t (pt is the (log of the) price level). The variable yt
represents the (log of the) output gap in period t where potential output has been normalised to zero.
Finally, the parameter α1 measures the slope of the Phillips-curve. The output gap is determined by
the following dynamic relationship:
y y R xt t t t+ += − +1 1 1β (2.5)
Following Svensson (1997b) we assume that output is serially correlated and stationary (0 < β1 < 1).
However, whereas in the Svensson model output is decreasing in the short-term real interest rate with
a lag of one period, here we assume that next period’s ouput gap is decreasing in the long- erm real
interest rate (Rt). This assumption can be justified on the grounds that the interest rate sensitive
components of aggregate demand generally do not depend directly on the day-to-day interbank
money market interest rate but rather on the yield on some financial asset with a longer maturity8. For
simplicity we assume that there is only one long-term interest rate in the output equation which
pertains to the real yield to maturity on a long-term indexed bond the duration of which is equal to
D+1. Finally, output is increasing in an exogenous demand shock (xt+1) which itself is also serially
correlated and stationary (0 < β2 < 1):
( )x x Nt t t t+ + += +1 2 1 1 20β ε ε σ ε; , (2.6)
Having described the structure of the economy it remains to specify the preferences of the central
bank. Monetary policy is conducted by a central bank with an explicit inflation target π* (say 2.5% per
year) that aims to minimise deviations of inflation from this assigned target, on the one hand, and
fluctuations of output around the natural rate (which is normalised to zero), on the other.9
Consequently, the central bank will choose a sequence of current and future short-term nominal rates
to minimise the following loss function:
                                                                                                                                                
However, given the preferences of the central bank such policies will never be optimal.
8  Of course, there will be many interest rates which pertain to debt instruments of both short and long maturities which
affect aggregate demand. In this respect, the parameter D can be seen as an indicator of the relative share of long-term
private debt in the economy.
9  As noted by Svensson (1997b) this means that the central bank does have a long run inflation target (π*) but no long
run output target (other than the natural rate of output). In other words, even though the central bank wishes to limit
















−   (2.7)
Here λ represents the central bank’s relative weight on output stabilisation while the parameter δ
(which fulfils 0 < δ < 1) denotes the discount factor (i.e. a measure of the policy horizon). The
expectation is conditional on the central bank’s information set in period t which contains current
output (yt) the current inflation rate (πt) and the structure of the economy as described by equations
(2.2) - (2.6).10
3. Derivation of the Optimal Instrument Rule
From the structure of the model it can be seen that next period’s conditional expectation for output
(Etyt+1) can be regarded as an indirect control variable for the central bank. Equation (2.3) shows that
for a given11 value of EtRt+1, the central bank can attain any desired value for the current long rate by
manipulating its instrument. This, in turn, allows it to target Etyt+1 perfectly.  Hence, as in Svensson





































As shown in Appendix A, the first-order condition for the minimisation problem in equation (3.1) will
yield a rule for the central bank’s conditional one-to-two year inflation forecast (Etπt+2). This
conditional inflation forecast thus becomes the central bank’s i termediate target for monetary policy
                                               
10  Note that here the central bank is conducting monetary policy from a clear forward looking perspective. This means
that - as elegantly stated by Greenspan in his Congressional testimony on 22 February 1995 - “..monetary policy will
have a better chance of contributing to meeting the nation’s macroeconomic objectives if we look forward as we act,
however indistinct our view of the road ahead. Thus over the past year (1994) we have firmed policy to head off
inflation pressures not yet evident in the data...”
11 As we will show later on this given value of EtRt+1 is unambiguously pinned down by the expectation that in every
future period the central bank will implement monetary policy so as to minimise its loss function.
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and can be expressed as follows:
[ ]E n E nt t t tπ π π π λδα µ λ+ += + − ≡ +2 1 12
* * ;         (3.2)
The reduced-form parameter µ is a function of the parameters α1, δ and λ (see Appendix A). If the
central bank engages in strict inflation targeting (i.e. if the relative weight on output stabilisation (λ)
is equal to zero), it will set its intermediate target equal to the inflation target. However in the more
realistic case of flexible inflation targeting, it will allow Etπt+2 to adjust gradually towards the assigned
inflation target π* (note that n ∈ [0,1] ). The speed of adjustment will then depend negatively on the
central bank’s relative weight on output stabilisation (i.e. ∂n/∂λ >0, see Appendix A).
From equations (2.4) and (2.5) it can be seen that the actual one-to-two year inflation forecast
dictated by the structure of the economy will be equal to:
tttttt xRyE 211112 )1( βααβαππ +−++=+          (3.3)
In Appendix B it is shown that, on the assumption that the central bank seeks to attain the optimal
intermediate target in each and every period (i.e. (3.2) holds for all τ ≥ t), the long real interest rate















































    (3.4)
Substituting this equation in equation (3.3) we can express the actual one-to-two year inflation

















































































Obviously, the central bank will choose it  such that the one-to-two year conditional inflation forecast
in equation (3.5) will be equal to the optimal intermediate target specified in equation (3.2). Hence, by
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     (3.6)
This equation has the same form as the Taylor rule and explicitly allows for an effect of the term
structure of interest rates on the optimal insturment rule (see Proposition 1 below). Note that this
endogenous interest rate rule will collapse into the Svensson rule if the output gap is directly
determined by the central bank’s instrument (i.e. if k=0).12
The effect of  several parameters on the extent to which the central bank’s instrument will respond to
economic fundamentals can be summarised by the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 1: 
The optimal response of the short-term interest rate to its determinants will become stronger if:
1. the duration of the long bond (D) increases
2. the relative weight on output stabilisation (λ) decreases
3. the degree of output persistence (β1 ) increases
                                               
12  In that case we obtain: it = πt  + [(1-n)/α1](πt-π*) + (1+β1+α1-n)yt + β2 xt which can easily be shown to be the
solution to a particular variant of this model where it holds that Rt=rt .
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The proof of this proposition is given in Appendix D. The first part of Proposition 1 summarises the
effect of the term structure on the central bank’s optimal reaction function.  The response of
monetary policy with respect to the output gap and the deviation of inflation from its target (in short
the degree of policy activism) will increase as the duration of the long term bond increases. This is
caused by a decrease in policy leverage over the long real rate since the latter will now to a greater
extent be determined by expected future short real rates at the expense of the present short real rate
(see Goodfriend (1997)). However, provided central bank preferences are constant over time, a
change in duration will not alter the central bank’s optimal intermediate target as expressed in
equation (3.2). Therefore, the central bank will have to manipulate its instrument more actively in
order to attain the same desired effect on the long-term real interest rate.
The second part of this Proposition is equivalent to Svensson’s finding that the extent to which the
central bank’s instrument will react to the output gap and the deviation of inflation from its target will
decrease as the central bank cares more about short-term output stabilisation. The intuition is that this
will reduce the speed with which the central bank wants inflation to return to its target after the
economy has been hit by a shock. This will induce a less activist response of interest rates. Obviously,
this result is insensitive to the question whether or not the term structure of interest rates constitutes
an important part of the monetary transmission mechanism. Finally, an increase in output persistence
(β1) will increase the effect of current exogenous shocks (xt) on next period’s output gap (yt+1). To
offset this effect, interest rates will have to be manipulated more actively if the central bank is to
attain its objectives for output and inflation stabilisation.
4. The Behaviour of the Term Spread under the Optimal Rule
This Section will study the implications of inflation forecast targeting for the spread between the real
short and the real long rate. First of all, from equations (2.3) and (3.6) the equilibrium real short -term
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(4.1)
Furthermore, using this equation in the expression for the equilibrium long-term real interest interest




n y xt t t t=
− − + + − +( ) ( ) ( )*1 1
1
1 2α
π π β β (4.2)
In our model the long term real interest rate is exactly the same as the ex ante real short term interest
rate (it - α1yt - πt) obtained in the model where the term structure is absent (see footnote 12). This
result should not be surprising since in both models the central bank seeks to attain the s mevalue for
Etπt+2 which implies that in both models Etyt+1 will be the same. The only difference is that Etyt+1 will
be directly influenced by it in the absence of the term structure while in our model the central bank
will set it such as to attain that specific value of Rt consistent with its intermediate target.
Next, we can examine the economic determinants of the real term spread by subtracting equation
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(4.3)
Since optimal monetary policy entails an endogenous Taylor-rule-like response to inflation, the output
gap, and an exogenous demand shock, the real term spread will also be driven by these factors. The
effect of these variables can be summarised by the following proposition (see Appendix D for a
proof):
PROPOSITION 2:
The real short term interest rate will rise relative to the real long rate (i.e. Rt -rt  will decrease) if:
1. the current inflation rate is higher than its target (πt > π*)
2. the current output gap is positive (yt > 0)
3. the current aggregate demand shock is positive (xt > 0)
If one or more of the determinants of the term spread take on a positive value this will mean increase
in future inflation. We have assumed that the central bank’s exclusive long run objective is to
maintain a level of inflation equal to its assigned target (i.e. the model does not deal with such issues
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as a persistent temptation to increase output above its natural rate and the concomitant credibility
problems which follow). The implication of such a fully credible inflation targeting regime is that the
central bank will not allow inflation to deviate systematically from its target and that, therefore,
output will not systematically differ from potential. Since, in addition, the unconditional expectation
of the output shock (xt) is assumed to be equal to zero, this means that the real short rate will not
systematically differ from zero either (see equation (3.1)13. Because the long real rate is essentially a
weighted average of current and future expected real short rates, the increase in the current real short
rate necessary to reduce inflationary pressures will be larger than the induced increase in the long real
rate.
Furthermore, as a result of the optimal reaction of monetary policy to the state of the economy, the
central bank will induce a positive relationship between the real term spread in period t and the output
gap in period t+1. This can be inferred from the following expression for the covariance between
these two variables (see Appendix C)14:









This result lines up with the literature on the effect of monetary policy on future output (e.g.
Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Fuhrer and Moore (1995)) and is essentially the consequence of a
systematic ‘leaning against the wind’ policy.
Even though these studies indicate that the term spread contains information about future output
growth, they also show that are substantial differences between countries. For instance, Smets and
Tsatsaronis (1997, p 4) present evidence that ‘(…) the correlation between annual output growth and
the lagged term spread is higher in Germany than in the United States(...)’. They attribute part of
this difference to the fact that the influence of inflation scares on the US nominal term spread in the is
much more significant than in Germany as a result of the fact that the Bundesbank enjoys a higher
degree of credibility. Furthermore, they present evidence that the Bundesbank reacts more vigorously
in real terms to various shocks than the US. In this respect it is interesting to investigate what the
practice of inflation forecast targeting implies for the sensitivity of the real term spread to
                                               
13  In other words, both the steady state real short rate and the steady state real long rate are normalized to zero in this
model (in the steady state  it holds that yt = xt = 0 and πt =π* ), i.e. real interest rates will not be systematically affected
by monetary policy.
14  For reasons of tractability, in computing this expression we have assumed that the stochastic output shock (xt) is
purely white noise (i.e. it holds that β2 = 0).
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its determinants. Evidently, a more vigorous response of the real term spread to these determinants
will lead to a stronger relationship between movements in the term spread and future output. The
results are summarised in the following proposition (see Appendix D for a proof):
PROPOSITION 3:
The real term spread will react more strongly to the current output gap (yt) and the current deviation
of inflation from its target (πt-π*) and as a result the covariance between this spread and future output
(Cov[(Rt-rt)yt+1])  will increase if:
1. the duration of the long bond (D) increases
2. the relative weight on output stabilisation (λ) decrease
2. the degree of output persistence (β1) increases
First of all, an increase in the duration of the long-term bond does not affect the real long rate itself
but it does require a more active manipulation of the short rate to attain that specific value of the long
real rate consistent with the central bank’s objectives. For given realisations of the underlying
determinants, the induced increase in policy activism will widen the gap between the real short and
the real long rate.  The practical implication of this result is that the duration of the debt instrument
which affects aggregate demand will be one of the determinants of the response of the real term
spread to economic developments. Because of this, the financial structure of the economy (i.e. the
extent to which spending depends on long term interest rates) will influence the observed correlation
between the term spread and future output growth. Hence, the fact that many VAR-studies (e.g.
Estrella and Mishkin (1997), Smets and Tsatsaronis (1997)) indicate that the real term spread seems
to be more strongly related to future output in Germany than in the US can also be partly explained
by the fact that the financial structure of the German economy incorporates a larger relative share of
long-term debt than the US.
Next, as the central bank attaches a larger weight to short-term output stabilisation relative to
inflation stabilisation (i.e. if λ increases), it will exert less influence on the output gap in any given
period. As a consequence, the term spread will be less sensitive to changes in monetary policy and its
predictive value for future output will diminish because of the weaker link between the central bank’s
instrument in period t and output in the subsequent period.
Finally, an increase in the degree of output persistence (β1) will increase the effect of current
stochastic shocks to the output gap on output and inflation in subsequent periods. To offset this effect
the central bank will display a more activist response to current economic variables which will induce
a closer relationship between monetary policy and future output.
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5. Implications for the Predictive Ability of the Term Structure
One of the implications of the expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates is that the
spread between long and short rates should have predictive power for future movements in short as
well as long rates. After all, rational expectations implies:
E R Rt t t t+ + += +1 1 1ν (5.1)
Here, the error term (νt+1 ) has an unconditional expectation which is equal to zero and its distribution
is orthogonal to both Rt and rt  .Using this in equation (2.1) we can write:
D R R R r Dt t t t t( ) ( )+ +− = − −1 1ν (5.2)
Hence, it seems that in a regression of  D(Rt+1- t) on the real term spread (Rt-rt), the slope coefficient
should have a probability limit of one. Nevertheless, such regressions systematically yield and estimate
of this slope coefficient which is significantly lower than one (for a survey see Rudebusch (1995)).
This result seems to either reject the assumption of rational expectations or the expectations
hypothesis of the term structure. However, McCallum (1994) has shown that the expectations theory
of the term structure can be reconciled with a lack of predictive content in the term spread by
explicitly taking the conduct of monetary policy into account. In particular, he postulates an
exogenous interest rate reaction function which features interest rate smoothing combined with a
response to the term spread.15 Assuming that the term spread is also influenced by an exogenous
serially correlated term premium and solving for this equation and the postulated central bank
reaction function simultaneously, he finds a slope coefficient with a probability limit which is
significantly smaller than one. This reflects the general idea that future short rates (and therefore also
future long rates) will be determined by future monetary policy and that, consequently, expectations
of future policy will be reflected in the term spread (see also Fuhrer and Moore (1995)).
In this respect it is interesting to see what our endogenously derived interest rate reaction function
implies for the probability limit of the slope coefficient in equation (5.2). Leading equation (4.2) by
                                               
15 McCallum justifies this by invoking the predictive content of the term spread for future output. This may, however,
be a monetary policy rule with undesirable consequences since this predictive content observed in practice is at least to
some extent induced  by monetary policy. Bernanke and Woodford (1997) show that adherence to such a rule may lead
to sunspot equilibria.
14






















































































Hence, in this model the slope coefficient will have a probability limit which is equal to one. In other
words, within the inflation forecast targeting framework the conduct of monetary policy will not
affect the predictive content of the real term spread for future movements in long term real interest
rates. The reason is that the central bank always sets short-term interest rates according to the optimal
rule. Since the response coefficients in this rule do not change over time this means that next period’s
long term interest rate will be predicable (up to a random error term) as well as can be seen from
equation  (5.3).
Consequently, the empirical failure of the predictive content of the term structure cannot be explained
in the context of inflation forecast targeting framework. In order to explain this failure either some
degree of interest rate smoothing (McCallum (1994)) or changes in the conduct of monetary policy
over time (Fuhrer (1996) must be relied upon. These two features probably do play a significant role
in practice. However, the problem is how to account for them theoretically since neither is optimal
given our standard description of central bank preferences involving a short-term (time-invariant)
trade-off between inflation and output variability.
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6. Summary and Concluding Remarks
This paper incorporates the term structure of interest rates into the Svensson (1997b) inflation
forecast targeting framework. In this respect it is found that if the term structure is relevant for the
transmission process, the reaction coefficients in the optimal instrument rule will have to be higher
than the ones implied by a model in which there is no distinction between long-term and short-term
interest rates.
We identified three parameters which affect the degree of policy activism. First of all, the duration of
the long-term interest rate which affects aggregate demand has a positive effect on activism since this
parameter is inversely related to the central bank’s leverage over long term interest rates. The same
holds for the degree of structural output persistence. On the other hand, the relative weight on output
stabilisation will exert a moderating influence on the degree of activism since it decreases the speed
with which the central bank brings actual inflation back in line with the inflation target. Since in this
model both the real term spread and future output are to a large extent driven by monetary policy we
also looked at the implication of changes in the afore-mentioned parameters for the sensitivity of the
term spread to the underlying economic situation and the covariance between the term spread and
output in the subsequent period. In general, a higher degree of policy activism will also serve to
increase both the afore-mentioned sensitivity and the correspondence between movements in the term
spread and future output.
Finally, we have looked at the question whether or not the conduct of monetary policy implied by
inflation forecast targeting can be used to explain the empirical failure of the predictive content of the
term spread for future interest rates. This question is interesting since it is generally agreed that such
an explanation requires that the monetary policy reaction function be taken into account explicitly.
However, we found that the optimal interest rate policy in this model implies that the term spread
should yield estimates of the slope coefficient in the term structure which are not significantly
different from one. The reason for this result is that theoretical explanations for the afore mentioned
empirical failure all depend on either some degree of interest rate smoothing and/or shifts in the
conduct of monetary policy over time. Neither of these is optimal within the present framework. We
leave the question whether or not the model can be altered in such a way as to yield these phenomena
as part of the central bank’s optimal policy rule for future research.
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Appendix A: Derivation of the Optimal Intermediate Target
This appendix provides a brief description of the derivation of the optimal intermediate target. For a
more elaborate treatment see Svensson (1997b). First of all, from equation (2.7) we realise that the
indirect loss function will be of the general form:
V E Et t t t( ) ( )




Here, µ0 and µ are coefficients which remain to be determined. Next, using equation (2.7) in the main
























Using equation (A.1) to find an expression for the partial derivative between brackets, we can write:






*           (A.3)
From equation (2.4) the conditional forecast of next period’s output will be equal to:





π π( )                                 
(A.4)
Plugging this equation into equation (A.3) and rearranging will yield equation (3.2) in the main text.
Next, in order to identify the coefficients µ0 and µ in equation (A.1) we realise that using equation
(3.1) we can compute:
∂ π
∂ π
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Plugging these equations into (A.5) and using the expression obtained for (Etπt+2 - π*) in equation
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2 F ( ) (A.8)
From this equation it can be seen that for k ∈ [0 , ∞ ) it will hold that F(µ) ∈ [1, λ/α2). Using this it
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Consequently, it will hold that: ∂n/∂λ = ∂n/∂(µ/λ) * ∂(µ/λ)/∂λ  > 0.
Appendix B:  Derivation of the Long Real Rate under the Optimal Monetary
Policy Rule
Leading equation (2.5) by one period, using equation (2.5) in the resulting expression, taking
expectations conditional on the information in period t and rearranging we obtain:
E R y E y R xt t t t t t t+ += − − + +1 1
2
2 1 2 1 2β β β β β( ) (B.1)
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Furthermore, by leading equation (2.4) one period and taking expectations conditional on the
information in period t, Etyt+2 can be expressed as follows:





π π[ ] (B.2)
Since the central bank will follow its optimal target rule in every period we can find an expression for
the term between brackets by leading equation (3.2) one period and subtracting equation (3.2) from
the result:
E E n n Et t t t t tπ π π π+ + +− = − − −3 2 11( ) [ ]
*         (B.3)
Note that the RHS of this equation will be equal to zero if it holds that λ = 0. Using equations (B.2)
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β β β β
        (B.4)
Plugging this equation into equation (2.3) and rearranging will yield equation (3.4).
Appendix C: Derivation of the Covariance between the Real Term Spread and
Future Output
Plugging the equilibrium solution for Rt obtained in equation (4.2) into the dynamic equation for
output (2.5) and subtracting π* on both sides of the Phillips-curve relationship (2.4)  we have the


























































The system has two distinct and real Eigenvalues: e1 = 0 and e2 = n . These indicate that the two
colunm vectors in the matrix A are linearly dependent and that the system is stationary provided n is
strictly smaller than one (which is the case as long as the relative weight on output stabilisation λ is
finite). Let vec(Φ) = (σε2 0 0 0)\ be the vector form of the variance-covariance matrix of φ and let
vec(V) = (σy2 σπy σπy σπ2)\ be the vector form of the variance-covariance matrix of Z. Assuming 0 ≤ n
< 1 we can compute:
19
































































           (C.2)
From this equation it can be seen that: ∂σy2/∂n < 0 , ∂σπy/∂n < 0 and ∂σπ2/∂n > 0 , i.e. λ (and therefore
n) affects the trade-off between inflation variability and output variability (see Ball (1997))
The expression for Cov[ (Rt-rt) yt+1] can be obtained as follows: First of all, we compute the product
of the expression for yt+1 found in equation (C.1) and the real term spread in equation (4.3) (setting β2
equal to zero in the latter equation). Subsequently, we take the unconditional expectation of the
resulting expression where we use the fact that: E(πt-π*) = σπ2 , E(yt2) = σy2 and E((πt-π*) yt) = σπy
and the fact that εt+1  is exogenous with respect to (πt-π*) and yt.




























































































Since it holds that ∂k/∂D = 1/(1+D)2 > 0 it follows that ∂bi/∂D > 0 for i = 0,1,2
20


































In Appendix A it is shown that ∂n/∂λ > 0. Therefore, we can conclude: ∂b0/∂λ < 0 and ∂b1/∂λ < 0.




























The coefficient for (πt -π*) will be smaller than or equal to zero since 0≤ n ≤ 1. The same holds for the
coefficient for xt since 0 ≤ β2 <1. Finally, for the coefficient for yt to be negative, the denominator of















Setting β2 equal to zero in equation (3.3), define the absolute value of the reaction coefficients for





















Then it can be shown that:18
                                               
16 Note that the inequality 1+k(1+β1-2n) > 0  can be rewritten as β1 > 2n – (1/k) –1. The RHS of this expression is
strictly increasing in both k and n.  Since in addition it holds that 0 ≤ k ≤ 1 and 0  ≤ n ≤ 1,  we know the inequality will
always be satisfied if it holds for the specials case in which k=n=1. Substituting this into the inequality yields:  β1 > 0.
17  Note that it holds that ∂b2/∂n = ∂b2/∂β1 = 0 because of which it can be concluded that a decrease in n and/or an
increase in β1 will unambiguously increase the degree of activism.
18  Note that it holds that: 0 ≤ k  ≤ 1  ;  0 ≤ n ≤ 1  ;  0 < β2 < 1 and that the proof that the denominator in the expression







































































































Since it is shown in Appendix A that ∂ n/∂λ > 0 , we conclude that ∂ai /∂λ < 0 for i = 0,1 . Similarly,
since ∂D/∂k > 0 it will hold that ∂ai/∂D > 0 for i = 0,1 . Finally,  from equation (3.4) we can compute:
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k n
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